Highlights and Commentary
By Roy Weitz
(Originally posted December 1, 1999)
[Archive Table of Contents]


Ryan Jacob has been slow to launch his new Jacob Internet fund.....The SEC appears to be the main stumbling block, as regulators scrutinize the new fund's prospectus, and try to fine-tune the presentation of Jacob's eye-popping track record at his previous fund (WWWFX).....Meanwhile, Jacob has decided on his new fund's Board of Directors, and it reads like a Who's-Not-Who of the financial world:

Ryan Jacob and
Uncle Leonard
share a chuckle
over their favorite
stock listings
If that last name seems suspiciously familiar, it is.....Ryan Jacob's Uncle Leonard will be one of the new fund's "independent" directors, and the SEC has no problem with this.....Ryan says that Uncle Leonard is a really smart guy, with oodles and oodles of business experience.....And even though Leonard is the brother of Ryan's father, Leonard will always have the best interests of the fund's shareholders uppermost in his mind.....(This, of course, flies in the face of everything you and I know about family relationships and human nature, but never mind).....Why didn't Ryan Jacob hire a more prestigious Board, and skip Uncle Leonard?....At the moment, it appears that Jacob is a bit short of cash, and he can only afford to pay his directors $4,000 per year....At $4,000, says Jacob, "I'm somewhat limited"


Some advice from Uncle Roy:

Ryan, remember when I taught you how to spell NASDAQ? Well, you're a big boy now, and you're managing big money. Maybe a billion dollars -- yes, that's "billion" with a "b." I know you're a nice kid, and you mean well, but it's time to grow up. Take out a loan. Get some financial backing if you have to. Hire an experienced Board, and pay them the going rate. Otherwise, your investors will wonder where else you're cutting corners. If you run this company the right way, it will be good to you for the rest of your life. If you run it like a fraternity party, there's a good chance you'll screw up. Oh, and one more thing. Stop pouting so much. Money managers don't pout. If you want to be Keanu Reeves, move to Hollywood.

There, that's enough lecturing for now. Go wash up. Aunt Shirley is making your favorite pot roast!


In journalism, there's nothing more important than credibility: We recently received a promotional mailing from Investor's Business Daily, with the following irresistible hook:

AIM Aggressive Growth -- up 89.6% in 36 months
PBHG Emerging Growth -- up 115% in 36 months

Well, maybe there was some 36-month period during which these funds were up by these percentages, but certainly not the current one.....For the three years ended October 31, 1999, AIM Aggressive Growth was up only 37%, and PBHG Emerging Growth gained only 8%.

The mailing continues:

"Please don't feel badly if you didn't know much about these opportunities."

Thanks, but we've already gotten over it.

How private is private? Your online broker has a lot of information about you and, these days, no self-respecting broker would be caught without a rousing privacy statement.....(Well, there are a couple of exceptions -- more about those later).....But if you read beyond a broker's initial assurances of privacy, you discover that a surprising number of online brokers manage to weasel their way out.....Below, you'll find FundAlarm's survey of online broker privacy practices.....First we present excerpts from each broker's obligatory pledge of privacy.....Then we present the weasel words (if any) that the broker uses to weaken its privacy pledge, and we award each broker an overall Weasel Rating.....If your broker earns a "3-Weasel" rating, our worst, your personal information could be anywhere....."2-Weasel" and "1-Weasel" brokers aren't as bad, but they still have serious privacy deficiencies.....Five online brokers earn our "No-Weasel" rating.....At least according to published policy, you can be reasonably confident that these folks will keep your private information private.

This online broker......makes this ringing declaration of privacy......followed shortly thereafter by these weasel wordsFundAlarm
Weasel Rating
(3-Weasels = worst)
Comments
The 3-Weasel brokers.....
NDB"At NDB.com we strive to instill customer confidence by maintaining strict restrictions on all customer information""In rare cases, NDB may share information with a select company that provides a product we believe will be of interest to you."
The cases may be "rare," but your choices are none. The NDB Web site offers customers no way to stop the dissemination of their personal information.
Quick & Reilly
and
Suretrade
(both owned by Fleet Financial Group, Inc.)
"The safeguarding of customer information is an issue we take seriously...""[We] may share information with [unaffiliated] companies if they provide a product or service that may benefit our customers"
When do customers get to decide if they want to "benefit" from third-party products or services? Never. Like NDB, Quick & Reilly/Suretrade offer no way for customers to stop the dissemination of personal information.
MSDW Online
(Morgan Stanley Dean Witter)
FundAlarm couldn't find a privacy statement on the MSDW Web site, so we sent an e-mail inquiry....."Please clarify what you mean by a privacy statement," came the ominous reply.....We did, and we haven't heard from them since.
No published privacy policy. Also, clueless and unresponsive. Where do we sign?
The accompanying page presents FundAlarm's 2-Weasel, 1-Weasel and No-Weasel brokers.....The following firms are rated: Ameritrade, Charles Schwab, Datek, DLJ Direct, E*Trade, Fidelity, Siebert, and TD Waterhouse.


From Schwab's most recent customer newsletter:

Do this..."History has shown that long-term investors who stay fully invested through market cycles have enjoyed higher returns than those who have tried to second-guess the market." [page 1]
No, do this... "...we've enhanced SchwabAlerts to include Pager Alerts...You'll receive short messages with personalized news that could affect your investments." [page 3]


"Net asset value" (NAV) seems like it should be an important number.....After all, it's quoted in the newspaper every day, and many investors think of NAV as the equivalent of a stock's share price.....In reality, NAV is often irrelevant, except over short periods of time.....Amerindo Technology fund (ATCHX) had a huge swing in NAV during 1999.....On the theory that extreme cases make the best examples, here's an example showing how NAV works using Amerindo's actual 1999 numbers.

Example:
On May 1, the NAV of the Amerindo Technology fund was 27.44.....On October 28, its NAV was 23.52 (in a minute, you'll see why we picked this date).....Therefore, you might conclude that Amerindo lost value from May 1 through October 28.....But when we look closely, we see that there was more going on with Amerindo than the mere change in NAV would indicate.....The key missing piece for Amerindo, as for many funds, was a dividend distribution.....On May 1, as we said, Amerindo's NAV was 27.44.....On October 27, the day before Amerindo paid its 1999 capital gain dividend, its NAV was 33.28.....On October 28, "ex dividend" day, Amerindo paid a whopping dividend of $10.15 per share, and its NAV dropped by the same amount, ending the day at 23.52:

Amerindo Technology D - 1999
DateNAV
May 127.44
October 2733.28
October 2823.52

Does the October 28 drop in NAV have any economic significance?.....No.....If you elected to receive your dividend in cash, Amerindo sent you a check equal to $10.15 for every share owned on October 27 (the "record date").....If you reinvested your dividend and bought additional shares, you ended the day on October 28 in exactly the same financial position as the person who took the dividend in cash.....Here's how:

Took dividend
in cash
Reinvested dividend
in shares
May 1 (initial purchase):
NAV27.4427.44
Amount invested (assumed)$10,000.00$10,000.00
Shares acquired 364.4364.4
October 28 (ex-dividend date) :
NAV23.5223.52
# shares already held364.4364.4
Value of shares already held$8,570.69$8,570.69
Cash distributed (@$10.15/share)$3,698.66N/A
Shares distributedN/A157.26=$3,698.66
Total value of investment$12,269.35$12,269.35
Increase in value (May 1 to Oct. 28)$2,269.35$2,269.35

In the case of Amerindo, the increase in the dollar value of your investment was $2,269.35.....Even though the NAV seems to indicate that this fund lost 14.3% (27.44 vs. 23.52), you're actually ahead 22.7% ($2,269.35/$10,000).

So much for NAV.


Did we just say that you're ahead 22. percent?.....In a nontaxable account, we'd be right.....But in a taxable account, Amerindo serves as another kind of example (if one be needed): Large fund distributions can have punishing tax consequences.....Returning to our example above, an investor in the highest tax bracket (39.6%) would owe tax of $1,199 on her $3,699 Amerindo distribution (a sizeable portion was short-term, and therefore not eligible for the 20% capital gains rate).....On an after-tax basis, this brings the Amerindo return down to 10.7%, or less than half of the pre-tax number.


Let's milk this example for all it's worth.....In the spring of 1999, Amerindo warned investors that it might make a large capital gains distribution in October.....Yet investors continued to pour money into the fund, including almost $20 million in September.....What mistake did these investors make?......(Everyone say it together:) "They bought a dividend!".....If you invested $10,000 in Amerindo on September 1, your pre-tax return was $771 through October 28 (7.7%).....Unfortunately, your tax bill could be as high as $1,053, which means that you actually would have lost money after taxes (-2.8%).


We were recently using our favorite search engine (go2net.com) to find an article by mutual fund columnist Charles Jaffe.....We entered the term "Charles Jaffe," and the search engine offered some provocative suggestions for additional searches:



When the Van Kampen name last appeared in these pages (October 1999), Van Kampen Emerging Growth was seeking an unjustified fee increase (since dropped), and the SEC had just penalized Van Kampen Growth for goosing its return with IPOs and failing to disclose that fact to investors.....This month, Van Kampen is at the center of a new controversy over its bank loan mutual funds, of which Van Kampen Prime Rate Income Trust is the largest.

Here's the background: Many banks issue floating-rate loans to businesses, and the banks then sell these loans to mutual funds and other institutional investors.....Most of these loans are junk or near-junk quality, but they offer attractive yields with low volatility (because of the floating-rate feature).....There is a fairly active secondary market for these loans, and there are "pricing" services that can assign a daily market value to these loans.

How do mutual funds handle bank loan investments?.....Most mutual funds rely on one or more of the pricing services, which means that most funds "mark" these loans to "market" every day.....If the XYZ Bank Loan Fund owns a loan that was made to Terminal Health Care Company, and Terminal Health Care declares bankruptcy, it stands to reason that the Terminal Health Care loan will decline in value, and that drop in value will be reflected in the share price (net asset value) of the XYZ fund.....Now, back to Van Kampen: Along with Eaton Vance, Van Kampen is one of the few firms that doesn't use pricing services for its bank loan funds.....Instead, Van Kampen uses the "fair value" system of pricing, which means that Van Kampen funds determine the value of their bank loans internally.....The results can be surprising.....Recently, for example, loans issued to several troubled and bankrupt companies were trading on the open market as low as 50 cents on the dollar.....Van Kampen mutual funds continued to place a "fair value" on these troubled loans between 89 cents and par ($1.00).....If the market is right about these loans, and Van Kampen is wrong, then the net asset value of the Van Kampen bank loan funds is overstated -- by how much, nobody knows.....How does Van Kampen defend its practices?.....We can't tell you, because Van Kampen refuses to answer reporters' questions.....Eaton Vance, on the other hand, is willing to talk with reporters, and its position is likely to surprise even a first-year economics student....Basically, Eaton Vance says that market values are wrong, and "fair values" are correct, because Eaton Vance has more information about these loans than the market does....The market was unavailable for comment.....But a spokesman said that the market hears this kind of argument quite often,, usually just before a major financial blow-up.
* "Is Van Kampen's Fair Value Fair?", Joe Niedzielski and Pallavi Gogoi, Dow Jones Newswires, October 27, 1999; "Fund Investors Worry Values May Be Off Base," Gregory Zuckerman and Pui-Wing Tam, The Wall Street Journal, October 29, 1999; "Floating-Rate Illusion," Lewis Braham, SmartMoney.com, November 2, 1999

Last month, we introduced our eight new Specialty fund benchmark groups -- Communications, Financial, Energy/Natural Resources, Gold/Precious Metals, Health, Real Estate, Technology, Utilities.....This month, we thought it would be interesting to see how these Specialty groups have performed over the past 36 months relative to each other, and also relative to the large-cap benchmark.....The chart below contains one vertical line for each Specialty fund group.....The top of each line represents the annualized 3-year return of the best-performing fund in that group, while the bottom of the line represents the worst-performing fund in that group.....The horizontal line, in red, represents the 3-year return of the Vanguard 500 index fund, which is FundAlarm's large-cap benchmark.


Some observations: Briefly noted:
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FundAlarm © Roy Weitz, 1999