Highlights and Commentary

By Roy Weitz

(Originally posted October 1, 2002) [Archive Table of Contents]
A wave of humility sweeping over the Janus funds would be huge news.....In the absence of that, we merely have some big news to report: There's going to be a major shakeup in the corporate structure of the Janus and Berger funds.....First, some quick background: For the past several years, Janus has been a subsidiary of publicly-traded Stilwell Financial Inc......Berger Financial Group, which runs the Berger funds, has been another Stilwell subsidiary.....Berger manages most of its funds in-house, but a few of its funds are run by subadvisors.....As of December 31, 2002, you can expect the following changes:

• Stilwell Financial Inc. will disappear and Janus Capital Management Inc., a new publicly-traded company, will take its place.
  
  
• Janus Capital Management Inc. will own several subsidiaries, including Janus Capital Management LLC, which will run the Janus mutual funds. No management changes are currently planned at any of the Janus funds.
  
  
• Berger Financial Group will be dissolved, and Berger's in-house funds will either merge with existing Janus funds or turn themselves over to Janus managers.* (The trustees of the Berger funds have hinted that they might look for managers outside of Janus, but that isn't going to happen.)
  
  
• The four Berger funds currently run by subadvisors won't undergo any immediate changes, except for a name change (probably to "Janus-something").**
  
  
• Mark Whiston, a marketing guy with no investment experience, will take over as CEO of Janus Capital Management Inc. (i.e., the parent company).
  
  
• Helen Hayes, manager of Janus Worldwide and Janus Overseas, will join the Board of the parent company, giving her even less time than she has now to oversee the day-to-day operation of her funds.
  
  

According to a number of press reports, these changes mean that Janus fund managers have finally won the battle to run their own company, to which we say, "Be careful what you wish for".....Under the old structure, Stillwell executives knew that they couldn't push the Janus prima donnas too hard, because there was likely to be a mass uprising.....Therefore, for the past two years, Stilwell has pretty much left Janus alone.....Starting in January, Janus fund managers will have the structure they've always wanted, and Stilwell shareholders will expect results.....If the Janus fund managers don't quickly generate better investment numbers, new-CEO Whiston and his friendly management team are going to face enormous pressure to make the kind of changes that Stilwell never could.....For that reason, we think manager changes at the Janus funds are now more likely than ever.
* The nine Berger funds that will disappear or undergo management changes are: Growth, Large Cap Growth, Mid Cap Growth, Small Company Growth, Balanced, International, International CORE, International Equity, and Information Technology
** The four subadvised Berger funds are: Small Cap Value, Mid Cap Value, Large Cap Value, Small Cap Value II


Mutual funds have been very, very good to me: This year's Forbes listing of the 400 richest people in America includes a "Green Thumbs" section, and that's where all the money managers can be found.....Even after a disastrous year for investors, the mutual fund world continues to be well represented.....The wealthiest Green Thumb is Abigail Johnson, daughter of Fidelity CEO Ned Johnson, who's reportedly worth $8.2 billion, while her father is worth a mere $4.1 billion.....Here's this year's complete list of mutual fund money bags, along with last year's numbers for comparison:

Name	Fund affiliation	Net worth (2002)	Net worth (2001)
Abigail Johnson	Fidelity	$8.2 billion	$9.1 billion
Ned Johnson	Fidelity	$4.1 billion	$4.6 billion
Charles Johnson	Franklin	$1.7 billion	Forbes missed him
Rupert Johnson Jr.	Franklin	$1.3 billion	Forbes missed him
Tom Bailey	Janus	$975 million	$1.1 billion
Alberto Vilar	Amerindo	$900 million	$1.0 billion
Michael Price	Mutual Series	$875 million	$900 million
Alfred West Jr.	SEI	$825 million	$1.2 billion
Tom Marsico	Marsico	$760 million	$750 million
Richard Strong	Strong	$750 million	$850 million
James Stowers	American Century	$575 million	NA
Charles Bauer	AIM	Didn't make it	$800 million
Jim Oelschlager	Oak Associates (White Oak, Red Oak, etc.)	Didn't make it	$600 million

Hey, Forbes (we tell you this every year, and you never listen to us): Check out the Lovelace family, which owns the American Funds.....If they don't also belong on this list, we'll eat an annual report.


The bond funds formerly known as Heartland:

	Background: On October 13, 2000, Heartland revalued bonds in two of its muni-bond mutual funds (Heartland High-Yield Municipal Bond and Heartland Short Duration High-Yield Municipal). In one day, the net asset values of these funds dropped by 69% and 44%, respectively. A class-action lawsuit ensued, and in March 2001 the SEC put the funds into receivership.
	Sideshow: On September 29, 2000, the sinking Heartland muni funds desperately needed cash to meet redemptions. The State of Wisconsin Investment Board (SWIB), which manages Wisconsin's public-employee pensions, stepped forward to buy $8.3 million of Heartland's distressed securities (a Heartland board member, who's also a member of the SWIB, helped arrange the transaction). According to the terms of the deal, SWIB would receive 100% of its principal, plus a minimum 20% annual return, both guaranteed by Heartland and its President, Bill Nasgovitz.
	Update: In July, Heartland agreed to settle the class-action suit for $14 million, of which $10.3 million will go to investors, and the rest to the lawyers.....Heartland's insurance policy will cover $10 million of the settlement.....President Nasgovitz will dig into his own pocket for the remainder of the settlement ($4 million), plus $5 million in legal costs. As a result of the settlement, shareholders in the High-Yield fund will receive an average of 32 cents on the dollar, while Short Duration shareholders will receive just 17 cents. According to the plaintiffs' lead attorney, the part of the settlement that Nasgovitz is paying represents a "very substantial portion" of his net worth. The plaintiffs' lead attorney appears to have some odd definition of "very substantial".....As a company, Heartland still has a market value of about $40 million, and Nasgovitz owns at least 75% of it, so even after all this messy litigation Nasgovitz is left with an asset worth at least $30 million.....On the income side, last year Heartland earned $8.1 million in management fees from its remaining mutual funds, and it probably earned another $3 million or so from its private accounts.....Assuming a 30% profit margin, Nasgovitz would have taken home a minimum of about $2.5 million last year, and he'll continue to do so, year after year.....That's not a bad return from a disgraced company that has stiffed about 10,000 investors. As far as we can tell, the directors of these disastrous Heartland funds haven't been required to cough up a penny.....So, next time a fund director tells you that his/her exorbitant director's fee is justified by the heavy "responsibilities" that they bear, feel free to laugh in his/her face. In early September, the folks at the State of Wisconsin Investment Board (SWIB) informed Heartland that it's time to pay up on that sweetheart bond deal, and the SWIB will shortly receive about $11.6 million on its $8.3 million investment, which represents a return of about 40%.....In other words, Nasgovitz somehow found the cash to pay the SWIB, and give them a spectacular return, even though he was supposedly tapped out after the settlement with the bond fund investors.....Can you tell us again how all investors are supposed to operate on a level playing field? The SEC is still investigating Heartland.....The SEC is still investigating Heartland.....The SEC is still investigating Heartland.
	Sources: "It's Wisconsin's Turn to Collect from Heartland and Nasgovitz," Karen Damato, The Wall Street Journal, August 30, 2002; also, several articles by Kathleen Gallagher at jsonline.com (the Web site of the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel)

"How many fund sites have no performance information?" That was the query recently posed by FundAlarm reader David Moran, and David was able to suggest at least one answer to his own question: The Web site of the Millennium Funds.....Sure enough, there's not a single performance number on the entire Millennium Web site, which, when you think about it, makes perfect sense for a fund family that has no performance numbers worth mentioning.....Still, it makes you wonder why they even bother with a Web site.....Given the fact that the latest "investor report" on the Millennium site is dated December 31, 2000, we've also taken the liberty of updating the firm's slogan:





Andrew Yeckel is a dangerous investor, because he actually reads the documents that mutual fund companies produce.....Andrew isn't happy with what he's been reading at Vanguard lately, and he also isn't happy with the returns on his Vanguard bond funds.....Here's part of an e-mail that he recently sent us:

"If you are looking for someone to criticize for having a misleading fund name, you need to look no further than Vanguard. The Vanguard Short Term Bond Index fund returned 1.9% during the first six months of 2002, when its Lehman Brothers bogey returned 3.1%. According to Vanguard's latest semi-annual report...this rather significant failure to match the index occurred because the fund overweighted telecomms, and "substituted" corporates for treasuries...I recognize that by prospectus Vanguard is allowed to invest up to 20% of assets in a manner that could be described as active management, but it sounds to me like the fund is engaging in a lot more active management than a reasonable investor would expect from the use of the term "index" in the fund name. Moreover, although the prospectus acknowledges the active management component for 20% of assets, the prospectus places a heavy emphasis on the passive management aspect of the fund, clearly stating that the fund is expected to closely track the index, minus expenses."

Andrew makes a couple of good points: The 20% active component is probably more than the average investor would expect from a Vanguard fund with an index label, especially an investor who hasn't carefully read the prospectus.....But even investors like Andrew, who have read the prospectus, might come away with the impression that this fund is virtually guaranteed to track its index.....For example, consider the following excerpt from the prospectus of Vanguard Short-Term Bond Index (try reading the black text first, which is the way Vanguard wrote it, and then read FundAlarm's additions in red):

"The Fund employs a passive management--or "indexing"--strategy designed to track the performance of the Lehman Brothers Aggregate Bond Index...The Fund invests at least 80% of its assets in bonds represented in the Index. The remainder of its assets may be invested outside the Index, in bonds whose characteristics and risks--including maturity, credit quality, and issuer type--are expected to be similar to those of bonds in the Index. To the extent that the Fund invests outside the Index, it may employ active management strategies. The Index and non-Index securities, in combination, [are expected to have] [will have] characteristics and risks similar to those of the Index. "

In this paragraph, Vanguard doesn't even hint that the 20% active component might not track the index precisely.....Similarly, Vanguard's prospectus discussion of its "corporate substitution strategy," which Andrew notes in his e-mail, leaves out an important warning:

" CORPORATE SUBSTITUTION STRATEGY. In "sampling" its target index, each of the Vanguard Bond Index Funds has the flexibility to overweight particular types of bonds relative to their representation in the target index. For the Total Bond Market and Short-Term Bond Index Funds, this normally involves substituting corporate bonds for government bonds of the same maturity. The corporate substitution strategy may increase a Fund's income, but it may also marginally increase its exposure to credit risk..."

Again, Vanguard doesn't even hint at the possibility that the "substituted" securities might fail to exactly replicate the index securities they've been chosen to replace (which, in fact, has been the case).....Over time, this year's shortfall in the Short Term Bond Index fund probably won't amount to much.....But a company like Vanguard should be able to do a better job of explaining the day-to-day risks of its fund, because day-to-day is where we all live.


Briefly noted:

• Manager John Muresianu quit Fidelity Fifty back in June and, according to the official Fidelity explanation, he left to "manage his own account".....Yeah, right.....Muresianu has since opened a hedge fund, and he's been quite candid about his reasons for leaving Fidelity.....As of May 31, Muresianu had steered Fidelity Fifty into a 32% cash position.....At about the same time, the Fidelity investment police ordered Muresianu to reduce his cash position to less than 20% by June 14.....Muresianu refused, claiming that he couldn't find stocks that met his investment criteria.....According to an internal memo, Muresianu also felt that he wasn't being paid enough, and on June 19 Muresianu resigned.....New manager Fergus Shiel, who believes in staying fully invested, reduced the fund's cash position to 4.6% by July 31.
  Sources: Erin Arvedlund, Barron's (Fund of Information column), September 2, 2002; "Fidelity's Muresianu Quit After Battle Over Cash," Kathie O'Donnell, Bloomberg.com, August 31, 2002; "New Fidelity Fifty manager puts a lot of cash to work," James Paton, Reuters, September 13, 2002
  
  
  
• Pass the smelling salts: With amazing speed, the SEC has proposed rules that would require mutual funds to disclose all of their proxy votes, as well as their underlying proxy-voting policies.....The SEC is asking for public comments during a 60-day period, and you can bet that the fund companies are going to complain that the new disclosure rules will create a huge administrative burden for them.....But here's something that we don't understand: Assuming that the fund companies have already been keeping some written record of their proxy votes -- and surely they have -- why can't the fund companies start keeping those records in an Excel spreadsheet?.....Excel has a feature that allows you to turn any spreadsheet into a Web document in about 10 seconds, and at that point it takes about 60 seconds to publish the document to the company's Web site (which is one of the things that the SEC will require).....Before the SEC buys this nonsense about "administrative burden," we hope they talk to someone who knows even the basics about Web publishing.....FundAlarm might even write and tell them.
  
  
  
• Pass some more smelling salts: SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt says that he will soon present a proposal for more frequent disclosure of mutual fund holdings.....Debated for years, and opposed by many of the biggest fund firms, Pitt says that the SEC will vote on the proposal "before year-end."
  Source: Speech by SEC Chairman: Remarks Before the Council of Institutional Investors' Fall Conference, September 23, 2002
  
  
  
• The SEC has slapped a $10,000 fine on the managers of the Davis Growth Opportunity (now Davis Opportunity), for failing to properly disclose the effect of IPOs (initial public offerings) on fund performance.....Even though the fund never allotted more than 2% of its assets to IPOs,* and it typically flipped the shares within a day, the SEC found that IPOs accounted for about 22% and 48% of the fund's total return in 1999 and 2000, respectively.....Davis will recoup the $10,000 fine with about two day's worth of management fees.....Since Davis wasn't required to reimburse the SEC for attorney's fees, and the cost of this case almost certainly exceeded the $10,000 fine, it appears that the only one really hurt by this investigation was the government.
  * morningstar.com, September 5, 2002
  
  
  
• American Skandia runs a slew of sub-advised funds under the ASAF label, and Janus has been one of American Skandia's marquee managers.....Well, not any more: ASAF has just fired Janus from all of its funds, and the reason is unusually unambiguous.....According to a top ASAF exec: "This is purely about performance for the shareholder. Janus believes it has improved its strategy. We believe otherwise".....Ouch.....To replace Janus, ASAF has reportedly selected Goldman Sachs Group and William Blair & Co., although ASAF still hadn't filed these manager changes with the SEC as of September 27.
  "Janus to Lose Big Client When Skandia Pulls Out," Aaron Lucchetti and Bridget O'Brian, The Wall Street Journal, September 27, 2002
  
  
  
• Mary-Kay Bourbulas is the manager of Strong High-Yield Municipal Bond.....In July 2001, Bourbulas told The Wall Street Journal that "the worst is over" for her struggling fund.....Several months later, in October 2001, the default rate on the fund's holdings had crept up to 10.9%, the performance of the fund was still dismal, and Bourbulas told the Journal that her outlook for the high-yield muni market was "positive".....This month, apparently tired of feeding BS to The Wall Street Journal, Bourbulas turned to another outlet, and she told Kiplinger's magazine that she is "slowly purging the fund of its worst bonds".....Meanwhile, the default rate for Strong High-Yield Municipal Bond still hovers about 10%, it's the only tax-free bond fund in the red over the past year, and it has the worst record of any muni-bond fund over the past three and five years.....What can investors expect from Strong High-Yield Municipal Bond?.....At the very least, another optimistic assessment from Bourbulas in about six months.
  "Strong's Weaklings," Jeffrey R. Kosnett, Kiplinger's, October 2002
  
  
  

  St. Timothy at work on his famous "Anti-Cosmo Epistle"

  The Timothy Plan, a "morally responsible" fund company, has sold all of its WalMart shares.....The main reason for the sale: Timothy Plan President Arthur Ally and his wife were offended by the sight of Cosmopolitan magazine in the checkout lane of their local WalMart, and the store refused to remove it. Source: Investment News, August 26, 2002

  
  
  
• If you can't succeed at something you know, try something you don't: A number of funds are asking shareholder permission to engage in short sales of stock.....As usual with such requests, none of these funds has any "current" intention of engaging in short sales, but the long side of the market stinks, the fund company lawyers have some extra time, so what the heck, why not ask for shareholder permission to sell short?.....Among the funds asking (or soon to be asking) for short-sale authorization: CDC Nvest Targeted Equity, CDC Nvest Star Value, Oppenheimer Disciplined Allocation, Oppenheimer Value, Henlopen, and Seligman Capital.
  "Funds Seek Permission to Short the Market, Chris Frankie, Mutual Fund Market News, August 26, 2002
  
  
  
• In an attempt to prevent its professional staff from being hoodwinked, Putnam says that it will henceforth send two financial analysts to industry conferences -- one to listen, and one to watch executives for tell-tale body language*.....If necessary, a third analyst will attend and chew gum.
  "Eyes Wide Shut," Adam Hanft, Worth, September 2002
  
  
  
• As we reported in April, Joseph DiMartino earned $810,000 last year as a director of 195 Dreyfus mutual funds.....To put that number in perspective, a director of Mellon Bank (which owns the Dreyfus funds) earned $44,000 last year for overseeing the entire company.....Over at Merrill Lynch, fund director Stephen Swensrud walked away with $406,000 last year, compared to the $58,000 that was earned by a Merrill Lynch corporate director.
  "Mutual Back-Scratching," Neil Weinberg and Daniel Kruger, Forbes, September 16, 2002
  
  
  
• Under current law, at least 50% of a fund's directors must be independent of the firm that manages the fund.....But here's something we didn't know: A fund company executive who's been out of a firm for just two years is considered "independent".....Here's how this loophole works in the real world: At Oppenheimer, a ten-person board that's responsible for overseeing 31 funds officially has nine "independent" directors.....But one of those "independent" directors is the former chairman of Oppenheimer's fund family, and two of the "independent" directors are former Oppenheimer executives.....All of a sudden, the nine "independent" directors on the Oppenheimer board have become six, and now barely a majority.
  Source: Forbes article, above
  
  
  
• This summer, American Century asked shareholders to vote in favor of liquidating its Global Natural Resources fund and, wonder of wonders, the shareholders refused.....Just as the old Soviet Union would have been stumped if an election didn't go as planned, no one at American Century seems to know what happens next.....According to one observer, there are several possibilities:
  
  
  • American Century can sell the fund, but shareholders also would have to approve that move.
    
    
  • It can hold another proxy vote.
    
    
  • It can keep the fund going.
    
    
  • It can walk away, and let the fund's directors find a new manager (this wouldn't require a shareholder vote, so it's probably the most likely course).
  
  Alas, no one ever said that democracy is easy.
  
  "A Case of Shareholders Who Won't Let Go," Charles Jaffe, boston.com, September 22, 2002
  
  
  
• We'd think we'd prefer the cash equivalent: At the Strong funds, one of the most sought-after employee perks is reportedly the opportunity to accompany founder and Chairman Dick Strong on one of his whirlwind educational tours of far-away places.....This year, for example, lucky employees got to accompany the boss on an eight-day trip to Belgium, Hungary, Spain, France, and Poland so that they could "better understand the mission and operations of the European Union".....Employees had "exactly two hours of free time" during the week-plus excursion, "but no one minded," according to one participant, because they were "having fun learning how the EU works, how new entrants like Hungary will change with membership and how the dollar has been affected by the euro."
  Pensions & Investments, September 2, 2002
  
  
  
• Last month, we reported that Kim Goodwin had left a high-profile position at American Century in order to become chief investment officer (CIO) at State Street Research.....This month, we report the juicy gossip: According to one version of the story, Goodwin was first offered the CIO job at American Century, but she wouldn't take it unless James Stowers III, growth guru and son of the American Century founder, agreed not to interfere with her work.....Stowers reportedly refused her terms, so Goodwin took a hike.....The official American Century version takes a nice little shot at Goodwin, but also confirms the Stowers-as-control-freak angle of the other story.....Thus, according to the interim CIO of American Century, "[Goodwin] was interested in the [CIO] job, but she wasn't going to get it...I know she had been thinking about other things for some time. She wanted more control than she could get here."
  "American Century to alter top execs' roles," Christine Williamson, Pensions & Investments, September 2, 2002
  
  
  
• It turns out that your neighbors just might be as dumb as you think they are.....Vanguard and Money magazine recently administered a national "Investor Literacy Test" to 1,000 people in 18 states, and the mean score for the twenty-question test was 40%.....Nearly 70 percent of the test-takers didn't understand the inverse relationship between bond prices and interest rates, 75% couldn't select the proper definition of expense ratio, and 64% didn't understand the impact of fund expenses on fund returns.....Only 2% of respondents scored 90% or higher overall.
  
  
  
• From the FundAlarm Discussion Board: According to a September 27 post by "Arthur Andersen," the Investor Literacy Test (above) was "no problem!".....In fact, "Arthur Andersen" reports that he scored 22 correct answers out of the possible 20.....According to Mr. "Andersen":
  
  

  "When I took the test, I got 6 answers correct. However, I estimate that next year's test will bring in an additional 7 correct answers. I then discounted my original 14 wrong answers down to 5 wrong answers, based on generally accepted testing practices. This gives me an additional 9 correct answers. Result: 6+7+9 = 22 correct answers."

  
  
  
• Start of a trend? An investment adviser in Little Rock, Arkansas is offering a rebate of 12(b)-1 fund fees to his well-heeled clients.....Investors who transfer $100,000 of domestic-equity "C" shares, or $400,000 of "A" or "B" shares, will receive about 70% (or $700 per year) of the total 12(b)-1 fees generated by their account, with the adviser keeping the rest.....The rebate percentage increases at higher asset levels.
  "Doing the unthinkable: Adviser to refund 12(b)-1 fees," David Hoffman, Investment News, September 16, 2002
  
  
  
• There ought to be a law*: According to morningstar.com, the WWW Global Internet Fund (WWGFX) didn't own a single internet stock as of June 30.....Hartford Global Technology (HGTAX) and UBS Global Biotechnology (BNBTX) hold just 1.6% and 5% of their assets overseas, respectively.
  * (Oh, wait, there is a law: SEC Rule 35d-1, which prohibits misleading investment company names)
  
  
  
• In 2001, 43 percent of all newly-created mutual funds were managed by hired guns (i.e., subadvisors), compared with only 13 percent of new funds in the previous year.....This trend isn't necessarily shareholder-friendly, since the average subadvised stock fund sucks up 0.21% more in annual expenses than the average in-house fund.....In fact, some subadvised funds might as well give their investors the single-finger salute....Example: The subadvised IDEX Janus Balanced is essentially the same portfolio as the in-house Janus Balanced fund, but the expense ratio of the subadvised fund is almost double (1.64% vs. 0.83).
  "Outside managers don't bring outsize benefits," James Paton, Reuters, September 11, 2002
  
  
  
• It was the first year of the Reagan administration (1981) when Dodge & Cox Balanced (DODBX) last posted a negative annual return, but it looks like the current bear market is about to claim another casualty.....Through September 27, DODBX was down 8.0% for the year 2002.....Unless the fund stages a terrific rally, Dodge & Cox Balanced is about to join a majority of its peers in the money-losing column.
  "Bears Imperil Fund's Winning Streak," Chet Currier, Bloomberg.com, September 20, 2002
  
  
  
• Robeco Groep, a Dutch company, has purchased 60% of Boston Partners Asset Management, which runs the Boston Partners mutual funds.....Robeco has a call option to purchase the remaining 40% in 2006, and Boston Partners has a put option (also in 2006) if Robeco doesn't exercise its call.....According to Boston Partners, no portfolio management changes are expected as a result of the purchase.....Robeco also owns the companies that run the Harbor and WPG funds.
  
  
  
• Interesting...inexplicable...and don't count on it:
  
  

  	"Technology stocks fare best in cold weather — specifically, November through April. Had you bought the average tech fund Oct. 31 each year since 1980 and sold on April 30, you would have gained 1,133%. Had you bought on April 30 and sold Oct. 31, you would have gained 32.2%. In contrast, the S&P 500 has gained 775% since 1980."
  --"One last shred of hope," John Waggoner, USA Today, September 26, 2002

  
  
  
• Mark Mallon is co-manager of two American Century funds, Large Company Value (ALVIX) and Tax-Managed Value (ACTIX).....Mallon was also recently appointed Chief Investment Officer of the company that runs all of the American Century funds.....In his new job, Mallon will oversee about $75 billion in investor assets, as well as "more than 160 investment professionals, including portfolio management teams, analysts and traders".....Mallon will continue to be listed as co-manager of his two funds, and he might even have time to think about them once or twice a year.
  
  
  
• Most readers are probably familiar with the basic Murphy's Law ("If anything can go wrong, it will"), but the subcategories of Murphy's Law are less well-known (for example, an automotive variation of Murphy's Law goes like this: "If you're working under the hood of a car and drop something, it will always roll to the middle of the car and just out of reach").....Ken Kivenko, a Canadian investor advocate, management consultant, and engineer, has compiled Murphy's Law for Mutual Funds.....Ken gave us permission to list some of our favorites:
  
  
  • "The first myth of portfolio management is that it exists."
    
    
  • "A fund management team can make a decision that is dumber than any of its members."
    
    
  • "Every fund style advantage has a corresponding disadvantage."
    
    
  • "Technical analysis is the science of what never happens twice."
    
    
  • "Never confuse brilliance with a bull market."
    
    
  • "Inside every lousy portfolio is a lousier portfolio struggling to get out."
    
    

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FundAlarm © Roy Weitz, 2002