Highlights and Commentary
By Roy Weitz
(Originally posted June 1, 2000)
[Archive Table of Contents]

We're introducing a new data table: [For the Archive, this item has been deleted. For an explanation of the FundAlarm data table, please review the following:
Deciding to Sell a Mutual Fund
How to Read the FundAlarm Data Table ]

More on the new data table: The new data table continues to compare the performance of each fund to a benchmark, and this benchmark comparison is still the basis for our 3-ALARM and NO-ALARM ratings.....Thus, in Section "A" below (taken from a new data table), we see that ABC Fund has underperformed its benchmark for the past 12 months, 3 years, and 5 years, and therefore it earns our 3-ALARM rating:

Portion of new data table for ABC Fund:



Section "B" (above) is new, and it should give you a better understanding of your fund's performance in comparison to its peer group, which we define as all funds with the same benchmark and style.....In this example, ABC fund belongs to the large-cap/value peer group, and Section B tells us that ABC Fund has generated a higher return than the average fund in its peer group for the past 12 months, 3 years, and 5 years ("Higher Higher Higher").

Looking at Sections A and B together, we get a more complete picture of ABC Fund performance: Although this fund has consistently trailed the large-cap benchmark, and therefore earned a 3-ALARM rating, it also has consistently outperformed the average fund large-cap fund with a value orientation (i.e., its peer group).....If you are committed to the large-cap value style of investing, you might be willing to cut some slack for ABC Fund, since it's performing well in comparison to its peers.

3-ALARM funds can exhibit many combinations of peer group performance......Here are some of the most common combinations, and how we would interpret them:

Alarm StatusTotal Return of
Fund Compared to
Peer Group
12 Mo | 3 Yrs. | 5 Yrs.
Comments
3-ALARMHigher | Lower | Lower Fund is on a rebound relative to peer group. You might want to give it more time.
3-ALARMLower | Higher | Higher The opposite of a rebound. Could be the start of a long slide, or just a temporary stumble. Either way, it's time to start watching this fund closely.
3-ALARMLower | Lower | Higher Fund is hanging on by a thread within its peer group. It could turn around, but it also could be heading for
"Lower | Lower | Lower"


Not that the Janus funds need another advantage, but according to a recent column in Fortune magazine, they have one: The sexiest recorded male telephone voice in the mutual fund industry....."The Janus guy--well, the Janus guy sounds like a cross between Dick Cavett and George Clooney," according to reporter Erin Kelly. "I imagine him wearing a pair of old Top-Siders, sipping Glenlivet..." Janus has never been known to pass up a marketing opportunity (for example, the new Strategic Value fund), and Phone Man has reportedly grabbed the attention of senior Janus executives.....In the works: A revamp of the Janus institutional sales staff.
Janus marketing trainees


By law, mutual funds are required to disclose their portfolios only once every six months.....Via the Internet, it's now possible for mutual funds to disclose their portfolios every minute.....Herein lies a conflict.....Investors -- at least some of them -- want more current information about their fund holdings.....Fund companies -- perhaps most of them -- like the current reporting requirements just fine.....The managers of the OpenFund, who already report their holdings in real time, recently wrote an (appropriately) open letter to the Investment Company Institute (ICI), suggesting that it might be time for the fund industry to consider at least quarterly portfolio reporting.....In response to the OpenFund letter, the president of the ICI rolled off a couple of beautiful, bureaucratic sentences: "The issue [of more frequent reporting] has generated discussion for many years, and the institute has considered it with many members on several occasions. Based on these discussions, we have expressed the view that the current requirement to disclose portfolio information semiannually remains appropriate"*.....The ICI president did say that he would be glad to put the disclosure issue on the June 20 agenda of the ICI rules committee.....In other words, look for the mutual fund industry to initiate more timely disclosure about the same time as the first John Bogle music video hits the stores.
*"Fund chiefs reject disclosure call," Mike Molinski, CBS.MarketWatch.com, May 19, 2000


Speaking of portfolio disclosure, fund investors already have access to one little-known document that can be either incredibly useful, totally useless, or somewhere in between.....It's Schedule 13G, which fund companies are required to file with the SEC within 10 days of any month during which they acquire more than 10% of a company's stock.....Fund companies are also required to amend previously-filed 13Gs, within the same time period, to reflect subsequent purchases or sales of a security.....There aren't many 13Gs filed during any given month, because 10%+ positions in any single stock are still relatively rare......But you could argue that the rarity of Schedule 13G also makes it a valuable document, since (by definition) the 13G highlights only major portfolio swings.....Why are 13Gs sometimes not-so-useful?.....In some cases, the 13G is filed by the fund management company, and it can be difficult to determine the individual funds that hold the security in question.....Janus does this all the time.....For example, on May 10, "Janus Capital Corp" filed nine 13Gs (original or amended), but none of the filings indicated how the stocks had been allocated among the various Janus funds.....Harris Associates (manager of the Oakmark funds) is an example of a multiple-fund management company that does indicate specific fund allocations.....And some filings are inherently easy to interpret.....For example, when Kaufmann files Schedule 13G (and they file a lot of them), it's obvious what fund it relates to, since there's only one fund in the Kaufmann family......If you'd like to set up a Schedule 13G watch list for your fund, it's easy to do with services like FreeEdgar.com




Henry Weingarten runs the private Astrologers Fund, and he's currently looking for backing from a U.S. bank to create a public mutual fund.....(No word yet on which banks are competing for this prestigious business).....Weingarten claims that financial markets have horoscopes just like people.....The Euro, for example, was born in January, so it's a Capricorn.....We visited Weingarten's Web site and, as usual with this kind of stuff, we have absolutely no idea what he is talking about.....Weingarten claims that he has an "investment track record second to none".....Good luck trying to find it.
"Astrologers Fund looks to stars," Dunstan Prial, Associated Press, May 23, 2000


How do fund managers screw around, when fund managers want to screw around?.....There are probably more ways than we know, but a recent SEC investigation of Dreyfus Corp., and former fund manager Michael Schonberg, offers one revealing example.....In late 1995, about the time that Schonberg began managing Dreyfus Aggressive Growth, he also managed three other Dreyfus funds -- Strategic Growth, Capital Growth, and Special Growth.....Although the Aggressive Growth prospectus stated that "investment opportunities" (such as IPOs) would be allocated "equitably" among competing Dreyfus funds, Aggressive Growth ("AG") was clearly Schonberg's darling.....During the first 12 months of AG's existence, the SEC discovered that AG was allocated 89 percent of all IPOs that Schonberg had access to.....By February 29, 1996, five months after inception, AG had appreciated an impressive 67%, but slightly over three-quarters of this return was due solely to first day IPO gains.....Ordinarily, investors might expect that Dreyfus senior management would have been measuring the impact of IPOs on fund performance, and also reviewing Schonberg's IPO allocations.....Instead, the SEC found that Dreyfus was asleep at the wheel (that's our technical legal term, not the SEC's).....For being asleep, as well as for other supervisory and advertising infractions, the SEC found that Dreyfus had "willfully violated" federal securities laws.....Dreyfus was censured by the SEC and slapped with a $950,000 civil penalty.....Dreyfus was also ordered to hire a consultant, who is supposed to teach the company everything it should have learned 40 years ago about running a mutual fund company.


And now, a rant: The results of the SEC's Dreyfus investigation, discussed above, were presented in the form of "findings," which the SEC allowed Dreyfus to accept "without admitting or denying".....It would be nice if the SEC would some day explain to consumers why fund companies are consistently allowed to get off the ropes like this.....As Business Week columnist Gary Weiss noted, the findings against Dreyfus were unusually clear-cut, and it would have sent a powerful message to the fund industry if Dreyfus had been required to issue just a three-word statement: "We were wrong"......Instead, on the same day that the SEC issued its findings, Dreyfus issued a smug press release noting that the company had "resolved" some "inquiries" related to the Aggressive Growth fund, and that Dreyfus would "remit" $950,000 to the SEC (sounds like they were just paying a big electric bill, doesn't it?).....Dreyfus even boasted in the press release that the SEC "did not find intentional wrongdoing" -- a cold-comfort spin if there ever was one, but a spin that Dreyfus never should have been allowed to make.


According to a recent Cohen & Steers ad, "there are a lot of innovators and trailblazers that pool their talents to emerge as the acknowledged expert in their field".....To illustrate their point about dynamic duos, the Cohen & Steers ad contained the following list of famous pairs (left), which we have attempted to put in context (right):



On May 10, Janus closed three more of its funds: Worldwide, Olympus, and Global Life Sciences.....Jim Craig, Janus Chief Investment Officer, noted that the closings ensure "that the portfolio management team can maintain the flexibility to find the most dynamic companies around the world in which to invest".....Two reporters, writing about the closings, noted that Janus now has virtually no flexibility in redesigning or moving its fund portfolios: "It would take months to steer [Janus] funds into less growth-oriented stocks without disrupting the market. For example, in mid-April, when Global Life Sciences made a move away from biotechs into pharmaceuticals, it put pressure on the entire biotech sector..."* So who's got it right when it comes to flexibility, Jim Craig or the reporters?.....Living in Los Angeles, as we do, we can't help thinking of the LaBrea Tar Pits:


A lesson for Janus?

Large animals, accustomed to dominating their territory, went out looking for a drink or a meal.....They came to the Tar Pits, which looked like just another lake, stepped in, and got stuck forever -- perhaps the ultimate loss of flexibility.....In other words, we think the reporters have called this one correctly.....We predict that you'll be hearing more about problems at Janus due to the size and visibility of its funds, problems that weren't on anybody's mind when Janus was still dominating its territory.
* "Behind Closed Doors, Is Janus Turning Bearish?", Ilana Polyak and Ian McDonald, TheStreet.com, May 10, 2000



or?

At the beginning of May, Hakan Castegren was the manager (actually sub-manager) of Ivy International and Harbor International, and both funds were closed to new investors.....By the end of May, Castegren was gone as Ivy manager, yet he was still firmly ensconced at Harbor, and both funds had reopened to new investors.....What's going on?.....Castegren's departure from Ivy was announced on the same day that Ivy reopened, and at first it seemed like he was quitting because he didn't want to manage a larger fund -- a classic (and expensive) act of professional conscience.....But a few days after the Ivy news broke, Harbor also reopened, and Castegren stayed put, even though Harbor has over twice the assets of Ivy, and Harbor is now certain to grow even larger.....All of a sudden, it looked more like Castegren was fired from Ivy, for poor performance, and the reopening of Ivy was a cover that served both parties well: Castegren could make it look like he was leaving on principle, and Ivy didn't have to draw attention to Castegren's recent, dismal performance.....Castegren's replacement is Sheridan Reilly, formerly of Scudder International Growth and Income.....More details on our page of recent Manager Changes.


We're trying something new: It's the FundAlarm eFinancial Makeover.....The name comes from Kristen, our high-salaried volunteer, and you can find the first eFinancial Makeover on the accompanying page.....The idea of the Makeover is to combine a couple of features that (as far as we know) have never been combined before, and see what happens.....Almost everyone enjoys a good financial case study, so the heart of the Makeover is a detailed study of a real FundAlarm reader, prepared by financial planner Bob Cochran, CFP.....Around the case study, we've wrapped a Discussion Board (which is separate from the main FundAlarm Board).....We hope that you will read the case study, and then get involved with it: Use the built-in Discussion Board to ask a question, agree or disagree with the planner's analysis or recommendations, comment on your own situation, provide a useful link to another site, etc.....If the eFinancial Makeover works, it could be a unique, collaborative creation.....We'd appreciate your feedback on the Makeover, pro or con.....If you're a financial planner, and you'd like to volunteer to work on a future makeover, we'd also like to hear from you.


Briefly noted:
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FundAlarm © Roy Weitz, 2000