Highlights and Commentary
By Roy Weitz
(Originally posted April 1, 1999)
[Archive Table of Contents]


The incredible shrinking funds: A mutual fund's asset base can shrink for two reasons: Investors pull money out, or the fund's holdings decline in market value .....In many cases, these two forces are at work simultaneously.....The accompanying page highlights the 270 funds in this month's FundAlarm database which have lost at least 25% of their assets over the past 12 months.....Most investors sense that a shrinking asset base is not a good thing.....Sure enough, 90% of our shrinking funds are performing worse than they were 12 months ago.....Does a declining asset base inevitably lead to poor performance?.....No.....But a declining asset base can be an important contributor to underperformance, and it's a factor that many investors continue to overlook.


Warburg Pincus floats a lead balloon: According to a company spokesperson, Warburg Pincus is "looking at the possibility of offering an array of funds to invest in just technology, financial services, and other industries".....The idea for introducing these sector funds comes from Brian Posner, who says that it's "a great way for analysts to learn how to manage money".....One has to admire Posner's candor, and we hope that he has the clout and courage to take his idea all the way.....For example, it seems unreasonable to ask investors to pay for a company's internal training program, so we suggest that Warburg charge no management fees.....Since many of these sector fund rookies will have chosen to manage money instead of going to graduate school, it also seems fair that managers be required to pay their funds each year the equivalent of M.B.A. tuition.....This money can then be used to defray fund expenses, such as pizza parties, beer busts, and "Team Brian" T-shirts.....No training program is ever complete without a system for evaluation, so Posner might want to consider an "Investor Report Card"......Managers with grade point averages above, say, 3.5 would be eligible for promotion to real funds.....Managers with at least a "D" average would be allowed to stay with their sector funds, and managers below "D" would be required to take remedial courses, attend summer school, or go to work for the Merrill Lynch fund family.


Engineers are lining up to invest, even as you read this:

"The moods of the stock markets, booms and falls can be equated with ebb and flood. Value investing functions like a turbine-driven power plant, which generates valuable energy from both phenomena."--From the American Diversified Web site


Lou-sy fund managers: There are 25 regular panelists on the Wall Street Week television show, and we still can't figure out how Louis Rukeyser selects them.....But one thing we do know: If you manage a mutual fund, you don't have to be a superstar.....Seven of Lou's regulars manage or co-manage mutual funds, and their records aren't good.....Elizabeth Dater has the most funds to her name (see table below), and almost all of Dater's funds have underperformed their respective benchmarks.....Frank Cappiello has posted some eye-popping negative numbers for both his small-cap and large-cap fund.....Brian Rogers manages two large-cap funds for T. Rowe Price, and one of them is a solid 3-ALARM (Equity-Income).....The other Rogers fund, T. Rowe Price Value, hasn't been around long enough to be 3-ALARM, but it's heading straight in that direction.....Is Rukeyser getting better at picking good managers?.....One of his newest panelists, Barbara Marcin, has been in charge of Citifunds Growth and Income for exactly a year.....Her 12-month return was -0.96, compared to 19.79 for the large-cap benchmark.

Wall Street Week
Panelist
Fund(s) Managed12 Mo.
Return
vs. Bench
3 Yr.
Return
vs. Bench
Benchmark
Frank CappielloCappiello-Rushmore Emerging Growth1.89-11.56Vang Sm Cap Idx
Cappiello-Rushmore Growth-21.06-17.1Vang 500 Idx
Cappiello-Rushmore Utility Income3.12-1.71Specialty
Elizabeth DaterWarburg Pincus Adv. Emerging Growth-11.68-9.5Dreyf MidCap Idx
Warburg Pincus Adv. Post-Venture-5.48-10.96Dreyf MidCap Idx
Warburg Pincus Emerg Growth Common-11.28-9.04Dreyf MidCap Idx
Warburg Pincus Inst. Small Growth-0.81.79Vang Sm Cap Idx
Warburg Pincus Post-Venture-5.13-10.55Dreyf MidCap Idx
Louis HollandHolland Balanced-0.98-2.8Vang Bal Idx
John KimAetna Balanced (A,C,I)-2.12*-1.34*Vang Bal Idx
Barbara MarcinCitifunds Growth & Income-20.75NAVang 500 Idx
Brian RogersT. Rowe Price Equity-Income-18.3-10.18Vang 500 Idx
T. Rowe Price Value-20.16-8.23Vang 500 Idx
Maceo SloanDreyfus Third Century4.17-0.81Vang 500 Idx
* Data is for the "A" class fund

We didn't forget Marty Zweig.....Although his name appears on several funds, he doesn't manage any of them.


Income? We don't need no stinking income. This month's FundAlarm database contains 176 large-, mid- and small-cap funds which have the word "income" in their name (mostly "Growth and Income" or "Equity-Income").....Owners of these funds might reasonably expect them to, well, pay income.....In fact, 12 of these funds have a yield of exactly 0%, and 19 of them pay less than .20% (that's $20 of dividends per $10,000 of market value).....Why does income matter?.....For one thing, it's nice to buy something that actually delivers what its name promises.....Also, as Manuel Schiffres notes in the April issue of Kiplinger's, some investors buy growth-and-income funds because they hope dividends will provide a cushion during market downturns.....Many of these investors may be surprised to learn that their "income" fund not only earns negligible income, but that it also has a heavy weighting in high-tech and health-care stocks.....Investors should note that equity-income funds generally have higher yields than growth-and-income funds.....The lowest-yielding equity-income funds in our database are Fidelity and Berger, at .21%, while several equity-income funds yield in the range of 1.5% or higher.

"Income" funds with 0% yield
Chase Vista Growth & Inc B (VINBX)
Colonial U.S. Growth & Inc A (CFGAX)
Colonial U.S. Growth & Inc B (CFGBX)
Diversified Inv Growth & Inc (DVGIX)
Marsico Growth & Income (MGRIX)
MFS Research Growth & Inc B (MRGBX)
Nations Marsico Grth & Inc Inv B (NGIBX)
Nations Marsico Grth & Inc Prim A (NGIPX)
North American Growth & IncB (NARBX)
Phoenix-Oakhurst Growth & Inc B (PBGIX)
Quantitative Growth & Inc Ord (USBOX)
SunAmerica Growth & Income B (SEIBX)

[For yields on the rest of the "income" funds in our
database, see the accompanying page]


Battle of the 22-year old mutual fund analysts: In early March, Standard & Poor's announced a new mutual fund rating service, which is designed to knock Morningstar off its pedestal.....S&P intends to slice the fund universe by category (large-cap growth, small-cap growth, etc.), and assign its "select" rating to fewer than 10% of the funds in each group.....Morningstar continues to insist that its 5-star rating is not a "buy" signal, but S&P has no such qualms about its "select" rating.....S&P hopes to set itself apart from Morningstar with better subjective analysis, especially more in-depth fund manager interviews.....In other words, S&P's employees just out of college will attempt to pry the truth from wily fund managers, who probably wouldn't give the straight scoop to their own mothers.....("Honest, Mom, I'm starting to see signs of a turnaround.")


Stop it! Please! I can't stand the insight!
"[The] portfolio managers and analysts work diligently to produce strong investment ideas and candidates for inclusion in the portfolio."
--From the Standard & Poor's "Select Fund" report on Janus Twenty.


Stop it! Please! I have no idea what you're talking about!
"Although the risk of the portfolio is high, the manager does not use volatility as a means of increasing returns."
--From the same Standard & Poor's "Select Fund" report on Janus Twenty.


Million dollar misfits: Mutual fund managers are often lured from one fund to another by professional recruiters, so recruiters are in a unique position to know how much fund managers earn.....(This is to be contrasted with fund investors, who have absolutely no idea what their managers earn, and couldn't find out even if they wanted to).....According to one top industry recruiter, money managers "with at least five years experience who oversee funds with at least $500 million of assets usually receive total annual compensation of more than $1 million and, in many instances, several times that."

This month's FundAlarm database contains 325 funds with at least $500 million in assets and manager tenure of at least five years.....Of these 325 funds, which are arguably run by Million Dollar Managers, 56% are 3-ALARM.....This is a pretty grim statistic.....But before we name names, let's give these high-earners a break: We'll toss out all the value managers, since the market has been beating them up.....We'll also toss out all the Specialty fund managers, since they could be stuck in an underperforming sector through no fault of their own.....As long as we're being kind, we'll toss out all the index funds, funds of funds, and funds managed by more than one person.....We're on a roll, so let's also toss out funds that have at least outperformed their peer group over the past three years, and funds that are on the borderline between benchmarks (small/mid cap, mid/large cap).....Sound the trumpets, we're done.....Herewith, FundAlarm's list of Million Dollar Misfits -- managers who are probably earning a million dollars a year or more, and don't deserve it.

Sorted by three-year performance vs. benchmark, worst first
Million
Dollar
Misfit
3-ALARM FundMgr.
Tenure
Fund
Assets
($mil)
Fund vs.
Bench
12 Mo.
Fund vs.
Bench
3 Yrs.
Fund vs.
Bench
5 Yrs.
Benchmark
John W. Ballen MFS Emerging Growth B (MEGBX) 6 6700 -12.99 -11.21 -6.31 Vang 500 Idx
Robert C. Doll, Jr. Oppenheimer Growth A (OPPSX) 12 1600 -15.03 -11.04 -6.73 Vang 500 Idx
John W. Ballen MFS Emerging Growth A (MFEGX) 6 5100 -12.18 -10.31 -5.39 Vang 500 Idx
Antonio Intagliata United Accumulative A (UNACX) 20 1790 -9.02 -8.59 -6.14 Vang 500 Idx
Brad Lewis Fidelity Stock Selector (FDSSX) 9 1650 -11.89 -7.52 -6.02 Vang 500 Idx
Cynthia Prince-Fox United Continental Income A (UNCIX) 6 573 -7.46 -6.14 -4.51 Vang Bal Idx
John Schaffner Nationwide Growth D (MUIGX) 18 994 -5.9 -5.62 -4.8 Vang 500 Idx
Mitzi Malevich IDS Growth A (INIDX) 7 4330 -3.95 -5.14 -2.14 Vang 500 Idx
Paul McMahon MFS Growth Opportunities A (MGOFX) 7 1080 -5.98 -4.88 -4.38 Vang 500 Idx
G.M Baliga IDS Blue Chip Advantage A (IBLUX) 5 1860 -3.92 -4.72 -2.84 Vang 500 Idx
James Walline Lutheran Brotherhood A (LUBRX) 5 1320 -2.56 -4.51 -4.86 Vang 500 Idx
Brad Lewis Fidelity Disciplined Equity (FDEQX) 11 3100 -5.49 -4.2 -4.65 Vang 500 Idx
Mark Bavoso MSDW Strategist B (SRTBX) 11 1750 -4.02 -2.79 -2.79 Vang Bal Idx


If we had to bet which of these managers is likely to be pursuing other interests soonest, we'd put our money on Brad Lewis.....In terms of damage, however -- the poorest performance with the largest asset base -- John Ballen and Mitzi Malevich take the prize.....Perhaps they feel guilty when they cash their $83,000 monthly paychecks?


Gotcha! Most mutual fund managers also manage private accounts, and it's not uncommon for a mutual fund managed by Company Z to buy stock directly from Company Z's private accounts, and vice versa.....Of course, in any transaction like this, there are potential conflicts of interest.....The potential for conflict is even greater if Company Z receives a performance-based fee for its private accounts, and a flat fee for its mutual funds.....Let's say Company Z owns a large block of Loser Corp. shares in its performance-based private accounts, and it wants to unload them -- now.....If Company Z dumps these shares on the market, the share price could take a hit, and so could Company Z's management fee.....But if Company Z sells the shares directly to a Company Z mutual fund, at "market price," everybody should be happy.....Well, not exactly.....It's possible that the fund could have bought the shares for less on the open market.....It's also possible that Loser Corp. shares are undesirable at any price, and the fund only bought the stock to help out Company Z's private accounts.

Ron Baron's money management firm recently got itself into a situation like the one described above, and TheStreet.com blew the whistle.....Seems that Baron's private accounts wanted to unload 650,000 shares of AMF Bowling, which represents about 11 days average trading volume.....Coincidentally, Baron Asset fund just couldn't wait to buy the entire block, and the fund paid 7 3/8 per share.....A couple of days later, and continuing for more than two months, other Baron funds started to unload their AMF stakes, at prices ranging from 6 3/4 to about 4 1/2.....Baron Asset held tight.....AMF shares recently closed at 4 7/8, representing a $1.6 million paper loss on Baron Asset's 650,000 shares.....After learning that the AMF transaction was under the microscope, Ron Baron's management firm decided that the AMF trade might not have been in the best interests of shareholders after all....Baron's firm has voluntarily put $1.6 million back into Baron Asset, and Baron says that he will continue to cover any further losses on those 650,000 AMF shares.


A reader speaks out:
If there's a mutual fund issue that's bothering you, we invite you to vent on the FundAlarm Bulletin Board.....But if there's an issue that's really bothering you, we'll try to make special arrangements.....Andrew Yeckel is really bothered by recent events at Merrill Lynch Growth.....He sent us a thoughtful analysis, and we think it's worth reading.....Andrew gave us permission to reproduce his comments, which begin below and continue on the accompanying page.
March 15, 1999

A case study in how not to treat mutual fund investors
======================================================

On Thursday morning, March 11, I was pleased to read that energy related stocks had surged on news of an impending deal by OPEC to cut production. This was just the sort of news I have been waiting for since the start of the Asia crisis in late '97. One of the victims of the crisis was a mutual fund I own, Merrill Lynch Growth fund, which, under the management of Stephen Johnes and Arthur Moretti, had built up a huge position in energy stocks during 1996. The effect of the Asia crisis was to drastically reduce overseas demand for oil, leading to a large supply/demand imbalance. As a consequence, Merrill Lynch Growth fund began a swift descent, eventually landing at the absolute bottom of performance ratings of domestic growth funds. It was a sad situation for a fund that had earned stellar gains, and the highest Morningstar ratings, throughout the '90's.
continued...


He would probably like to rephrase this:

"We're quite complimented and gratified that such a high-quality fund would choose a firm like ours."--Roger Hertog, President of Sanford C. Bernstein & Co., which was recently appointed co-manager of Vanguard Windsor


A rumor: Out of this happy confluence comes our hot rumor: Executives at the Strong funds are negotiating with Goldman Sachs to provide financing for a management buyout, and Goldman will take a major equity position in the acquired firm.....In fact, the deal already may be done, and the announcement is just waiting until the Goldman IPO is out of the way.....A lot of the pieces fit, and our source is a good one..... Remember where you heard this one!


You've heard of "deep coma," now say hello to "deep value": If you're a large-cap value manager, and you haven't been able to outperform a large-cap benchmark like the S&P 500, you can always compare yourself to your peer group.....But what happens if you've also performed much worse than your peer group?.....You change the rules, of course, and you start calling yourself a "deep value" manager.....That way, nobody knows exactly what you mean.....Even better, nobody can compare your performance to any benchmark or peer group.....We've been hearing the term "deep value" a lot recently.....The latest underperforming manager to publicly profess "deep value" is Charles Freeman, of Vanguard Windsor.....The directors of Vanguard Windsor recently took a sizable chunk of money away from Freeman, and gave it to Sanford Bernstein & Co.....Freeman sees a silver lining, although investors will be excused if they don't share his excitement: "I am pleased that the fund's distinctive, deep-value style will not be diluted going forward."

[For those who wish to obtain a first-hand experience of deep value,
Vanguard Windsor will reopen to new investors on June 1, 1999]


Briefly noted:
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FundAlarm © Roy Weitz, 1999