Highlights and Commentary
By Roy Weitz
(Originally posted April 1, 2000)
[Archive Table of Contents]


A wacky market gets even wackier: If you follow technology mutual funds, you've probably become accustomed to some eye-popping 12-month returns.....But even jaded technology investors might be surprised by some of the 12-month returns that appear in this month's edition of FundAlarm.....Even more astonishing is how these returns have increased just since last month.....Consider, for example, Firsthand Technology Innovators......Last month, Firsthand Technology Innovators sported a 12-month return of 189% -- impressive performance in anybody's book.....This month, the same fund shows a 12-month return of 379%.....Not only is the latter return mind-boggling, it also seems impossible that any 12-month return could increase by that much (189% --> 379%) in the space of just 30 days.....But it's true, and it's all a matter of arithmetic: Last month's 189% return covered the period from February 1999 through January 2000, while this month's 379% return spans the period from March 1999 through February 2000.....February 2000 was a record-breaking month for many tech funds, including Firsthand Tech Innovators (up 49.7%), while February 1999, which has now rolled out of the performance calculation, was the second worst month in the fund's history (-9.70%)......In a short-term performance calculation, replacing one bad month (February 1999) with one phenomenal month (February 2000) can have a huge impact.

The accompanying page lists the 48 funds in this month's database that have 12-month returns at least 100 percentage points higher than last month.....As you marvel at this list, we'd also like to suggest that it contains a lesson.....For volatile funds, short-term performance numbers are essentially meaningless.....Investors who base decisions soley on short-term performance are engaged in a futile exercise of the highest order.


For value managers, it has finally come to this:

"Athletes have to be doing something with their money so they might as well [give] it to us."
-- Neuberger Berman, a value manager, making a
pitch for its new athlete advisory service


Not exactly an epic struggle, but pretty good for the mutual fund world: Most mutual funds dislike short-term investors, because they trigger additional costs that long-term investors must ultimately bear.....About 550 funds now impose fees on short-term redemptions and, in all cases, those fees are paid into a pot that benefits the remaining shareholders, rather than the fund company.....As a general principle, we're in favor of short-term redemption fees, for the same reason that we're in favor of water meters: People who use more of a resource should be asked to pay more.....But we've always been troubled by the "flat" nature of redemption fees: If I'm asked to pay a flat 2% redemption fee, it's extremely unlikely that I've caused my fund exactly 2% worth of damage.....To the extent that a flat fee overstates the real damage I've caused, it's pretty clear that I'm being hit with a penalty.

The preceding discussion is more than academic, since the SEC and several fund companies are currently squabbling over the same issues.....Up until recently, for example, Amerindo Technology fund imposed a short-term redemption fee of 3%.....At the request (read: insistence) of the SEC, Amerindo recently reduced the fee to 2%.....The SEC takes the position that mutual fund shares must remain "redeemable securities," and "redeemable" means that the owner must receive the "approximate" net asset value (NAV).....If more than 2% of the NAV is taken out for an early redemption fee, the SEC says that the fund is no longer dealing in redeemable securities, and no fund wants to go down that road (can you say "big penalties and really bad publicity?").

Incredibly, the SEC doesn't routinely review fund documents for redemption fees, and the SEC only takes action against a high fee that is brought to its attention.....Some troublemaker at Morningstar recently informed the SEC that Fidelity Small Cap Stock imposes a 3% redemption fee, and that news has apparently started some wheels turning in Washington.....Fidelity seems confident that the SEC will allow it to keep the 3% redemption fee, but we wouldn't count on it.....Fidelity's best chance is to prove to the SEC that every short-term investor causes the fund at least 3% worth of damage.....In other words, make the redemption fee look more like a water bill, and less like a traffic ticket.....If Fidelity can't do that, we predict that its 3% fee will fall.


Let's go back to April 1998, and assume you had $270 million burning a hole in your pocket. What could you have done with that money?

Alternative #1:
Invest in the Vanguard Balanced Index Fund
Alternative #2:
Buy the Founders family
of mutual funds
Appropriate for:Conservative, relatively unsophisticated buy-and-hold investors Corporate big-shots (like Mellon/Dreyfus) who are seeking to build a mutual fund empire
Ways to screw up:NoneFail to understand the business you are buying, fail to understand the corporate culture, change compensation systems that already work, fail to bind key mutual fund managers
Value of your $270 million investment,
as of February 29, 2000:
$331 millionIt's got to be better than a balanced fund. Right?


In fact, Mellon/Dreyfus did buy the Founders funds in April 1998, and they did screw up in every way indicated above.....CEO Jon Zeschin left a short time after the Mellon purchase, star manager Ed Keeley fled right after Zeschin, morale suffered, and assets under management shrank.....Tracy Stouffer, who took over Founders Passport (Now Dreyfus Founders Passport) in July 1999, has been about the only positive news at Founders since the Dreyfus purchase.....We estimate that Founders is currently worth about $310 million (this assumes the company would fetch the same multiple of assets as it did in April 1998).....An unsophisticated investor who took $270 million in April 1998 and simply invested that sum in the Vanguard Balanced Index Fund would now have about $331 million in value, or $21 million more than the hot-shot corporate dealmakers at Mellon/Dreyfus.....So much for thinking those big, strategic thoughts.
"Mellon's Fund Deals: Slow to Bear Fruit," Ken Brown, The Wall Street Journal, March 15, 2000


Pump me up:


Vanguard CEO
John Brennan (left),
with a friend
For the first time since 1996, Vanguard is adding an actively-managed fund to its line-up, and this time it's a muscular growth fund.....If shareholders approve, Turner Growth Equity fund will become Vanguard Growth Equity fund early this summer......Exactly why Turner Growth Equity shareholders should approve the transformation of their now-successful fund into a soon-to-be-bloated behemoth eludes us, but we're assuming that approval will be granted.....Vanguard's motivation is much easier to discern.....Vanguard stands to inherit a terrific track record from this fund, and Vanguard will get a badly-needed infusion of growth-stock hormones.....In an apparent act of contrition, Vanguard also announced that it's starting a new U.S. Value fund, which will be managed by the folks who manage the GMO family of funds.


Remember the good old days of colonialism, when big powers would swoop down on little powers and take whatever they wanted?.....Isn't that pretty much what Vanguard is doing with Turner Growth Equity?.....Well, not exactly, because Turner shareholders have the right to refuse Vanguard's offer, but Vanguard is counting on the fact that mutual fund shareholders almost never vote against management .....As we noted above, we can't think of a single reason why Turner Growth Equity shareholders would be better off as Vanguard shareholders, except for a slightly lower expense ratio (worth about $35 per year on a $10,000 account).....And even if the move to Vanguard were a non-event -- which is far from certain -- why should Turner shareholders agree to rock their boat so that Vanguard can annex a track record?.....If Vanguard wants a growth fund, it should go out and build one of its own......But as long as Vanguard has decided to take the lazy way out, and it's asking for permission to colonize, Turner shareholders should answer with a resounding "No."


Be careful how you mix 'em: Some funds fit together well, some don't, and even index-fund investors need to be aware of the difference.....Herewith, some good and bad index fund combinations:







Bad mix: If you already own an S&P 500 index fund, you probably don't want a fund based on the Wilshire 5000 index (for example, Vanguard Total Stock Market).....In terms of market capitalization, the S&P 500 index already includes about 70% of the Wilshire 5000, so a fund based on the larger index adds little diversification.

Good mix: On the other hand, "extended-market" index funds typically track the Wilshire 4500, an index that excludes all S&P 500 stocks.....Extended-market funds are available from Vanguard, Fidelity, and T. Rowe Price (among others), and they provide good small- and mid-cap diversification -- exactly what you're missing with an S&P 500 fund.

Bad mix: If you already own an S&P 500 index fund, and you want an index fund that provides additional exposure to technology stocks, the Technology Sector Spider is not the way to go.....The Technology Sector Spider, an exchange-traded fund, represents the 91 tech stocks that are included in the S&P 500.....By adding the Tech Spider to an S&P 500 index fund, you merely increase your position in tech stocks that you already own.

Good mix: On the other hand, the S&P 500 and the Nasdaq 100 tracking stock (ticker: QQQ) have only 33 stocks in common.....The QQQ is an exchange-traded index fund, which includes the 100 largest nonfinancial stocks on the Nasdaq.....Currently, 73% of the QQQ is made up of technology stocks and, as a whole, the QQQ consists of younger, hotter tech companies than the S&P 500.


Mutual fund managers are paid to understand how companies work, and if there's one business you'd expect a manager to understand, it's the mutual fund business.....That's why we were surprised to read some recent comments by Robert Loest, who manages two funds for the IPS family (Millennium and New Frontier)......In commentary posted on the IPS Web site, Mr. Loest argues that mutual fund expense ratios are actually low, and that fund management companies are underpaid:

"Good fund managers are hard to come by. The financial press ought to give them a break, and stop beating up on them for making a margin of profit that's often a fraction of what a bank or grocery store makes."

Elsewhere on the site, Loest continues with the same theme:

"Not many businesses can survive on a 0.2% - 0.5% profit margin per year. Grocery stores make 4 - 10 times the profit margin [that mutual fund companies] do. "

One hopes that Mr. Loest understands his beloved technology companies better than his own industry, because his numbers are simply wrong and ridiculous.....Mutual fund companies like IPS, which manage relatively small funds, may struggle for a while to break even.....But once a mutual fund passes the break-even point, it becomes a money machine for its management company, with profit margins that can easily reach 70% to 90%.....For example, let's take the IPS Millennium fund: Every additional $10 million that is invested in the Millennium fund currently means an additional $115,000 in fees for Loest's management company.....Assuming that Loest's company is already covering the fixed expenses of the Millennium fund, which seems likely, the additional cost of taking another $10 million under management is minuscule -- perhaps $5,000 in postage, printing and other expenses.....Small fund companies like IPS do have an extra cost burden, since they must pay over part of their management fee to the mutual fund supermarkets (like Schwab) that help them raise their money.....But even with a supermarket charge, which typically runs about 0.25% of assets, Loest's company probably nets about $85,000 for every $115,000 it earns in management fees.....In my accounting book, that works out to a pre-tax profit margin of 74%.

The next sound you will hear is a thud, as I tell my local grocer that his store makes "4 - 10 times the profit margin" of a mutual fund company.


Poor Janus: Even though a number of the Janus funds are closed, and some don't even exist yet, investors still insist on sending checks.....Instead of going through the "hassle and headache" of returning those checks (open envelope, identify check as incorrect, type mailing label, insert check in return envelope, seal, stamp, mail), Janus has instituted a new policy: All incorrect checks will automatically be deposited in a Janus money market account.....Janus will close the money market account upon request, or transfer the money into any available Janus fund, but now it's the investor who will have the hassle and headache, along with an unexpected 1099 form.....Meanwhile, Janus earns the management fee from the money market account.
"Shut Out of a Janus Fund? Don't Expect Your Check Back Right Away," Ian McDonald, TheStreet.com, March 21, 2000


For those who worry that the U.S. economy may be overheating, here's some encouraging news: The average annual pay of the top 50 mutual fund directors rose only about 2.5% last year, to just over $234,000.....But even with such a modest increase, these public-spirited corporate citizens are still managing to put food on the table.....For example, Joseph DiMartino, a director for 189 Dreyfus Funds, receives an annual paycheck of $642,000.....Assuming that DiMartino spends a generous 10 hours per fund per year, that works out to a rate of $340 an hour, which is actually on the low side among his peers (thanks, Joe!).....John McDonald, a director for eight of the penny-pinching American funds, earns $229,500 per year, which is equivalent to about $2,869 an hour.....Wayne Whalen, a director for 105 Van Kampen funds, toils away at $272 per hour ($285,000 per year), but at least there's light at the end of Whalen's long tunnel: When he retires as director, Van Kampen will pay him $157,500 per year for 10 years.....Of course, some directors can't take the risk of a pension that will end after 10 years, so fund companies also offer lifetime retirement benefits.....Manuel Johnson, a director for 93 Morgan Stanley funds, scrapes by on $224 an hour ($208,000 per year), but he's looking at a lifetime pension benefit of $75,000 per year.....When a fund director spends his entire career schmoozing and pushing pencil, it's nice to know that some employers still care.
"Fund pay: $1,000 an hour," Ilana Polyak, Investment News, March 20, 2000


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Briefly noted: FundAlarm © Roy Weitz, 2000