| Highlights and Commentary |
| By Roy Weitz |
Funds for all seasons, and funds for none: Five years ago this month, the stock market bubble burst.....Today's stock market is a very different place than it was in March 2000, yet some funds that were top performers five years ago have been able to adapt to this new market, and maintain their benchmark-beating ways.....On the other hand, some funds can't seem to find a market they like: They were underperformers at the beginning of the decade, and they are still laggards today.....The accompanying page lists all NO-ALARM (Honor Roll) funds in this month's database that were also NO-ALARM in March 2000.....At the other end of the spectrum, the accompanying page also lists all of today's 3-ALARM funds that were 3-ALARM five years ago.....Here's a short list of ten relatively large funds: Five of them are perennial stars (NO-ALARM), and five are perennial bottom feeders (3-ALARM).....Can you tell which is which?
| 1. Oppenheimer Main St B (OMSBX) |
| 2. American Funds Growth Fund A (AGTHX) |
| 3. Scudder Total Return A (KTRAX) |
| 4. Fidelity Contrafund (FCNTX) |
| 5. AXP Stock A (INSTX) |
| 6. Vanguard Primecap (VPMCX) |
| 7. T. Rowe Price New America Gr (PRWAX) |
| 8. Julius Baer Intl Eqty A (BJBIX) |
| 9. Calvert Social Inv Bal A (CSIFX) |
|
10. Excelsior Value & Restruct (UMBIX) |
Last October, we noted that Fidelity was lowering the management fee to ten basis points (0.10%) on several of its index funds, in a direct attack on Vanguard's indexing business.....It took a while, but Vanguard CEO John Brennan has finally responded to Fidelity's move.....In an "interview" posted on Vanguard's Web site, Brennan refers to recent fee reductions by Vanguard's "competitors" as (variously) "just marketing," "a marketing ploy," and "opportunistic marketing".....We tend to agree with Brennan, and we doubt that Fidelity's fee reductions (technically, fee waivers) will stick for very long..... But Brennan needs to be careful when he sneers at other firms for their marketing efforts.....As "Ed" recently pointed out, on the FundAlarm Discussion Board, "the biggest marketing ploy out there is Vanguard's 'unique structure,' the one that misleads investors into believing they own Vanguard".....We're not sure this is the biggest marketing ploy out there, but Ed definitely has a point: Vanguard gets a huge amount of marketing mileage by claiming to provide its services "at cost," as well as by hyping its "mutual" structure.....In reality, "at cost" is a very flexible concept, and Vanguard investors have no rights that even vaguely resemble those of a business owner (for example, Vanguard investors have no right to know how much their employees are paid, including Brennan himself).....Before all of you Vanguard fans send us a bunch of irate e-mails, please read on: Yes, we agree, Vanguard is still one of the best citizens in an industry with many suspect characters.....But Vanguard also has benefited from a long, free marketing ride, and Brennan should consider that fact before he self-righteously disses the competition.
Eliot Spitzer, New York's crusading attorney general, blasted the SEC at a recent industry conference, declaring that the SEC "hired gnomes rather than people who think"*.....SEC Chairman William Donaldson reportedly "turned as red as his pointy little hat," but had no public reaction to Spitzer's comment.
Can the first class-action lawsuit be far behind? If you put money in a principal-protected fund, and keep it there for the required amount of time (typically, five to seven years), you'll always get back at least your initial investment.....Since principal-protected funds are allowed to invest in common stocks, this seems like a classic win-win proposition for investors: At best, you'll earn the stock market rate of return, at worst you'll get back your principal (less fees and sales commissions)....The catch, of course, is that while a principal-protected fund theoretically can invest all of its assets in the stock market, in the real world most principal-protected funds hold only a minuscule stock position (otherwise, the fund might have a hard time meeting its return-of-principal guarantee).....In 2004 and 2003, the average stock fund gained 12% and 33%, respectively, while the average principal-protected fund gained just 2% and 5%, reflecting the minimal stock market exposure of most principal-protected funds.....Principal-protected shareholders are starting to feel left out of the stock-market party, and principal-protected funds are starting to bleed assets (about $1.5 billion, or 20 percent of total peak assets, was pulled out last year alone).....One broker who sold principal-protected funds complains that 20-20 hindsight is responsible for today's unhappiness with the vehicle, and he says that principal-protected funds served a legitimate investment purpose during the bear market*.....We disagree: From the day the first principal-protected fund was rolled out, it was clear that (a) many investors wouldn't understand what they were buying and (b) this was an investment vehicle guaranteed to be plagued by 20-20 hindsight, once the stock market recovered.....The companies that marketed principal-protection funds have earned some nice fees.....Now, they can probably get ready to give back some of that money to their lawyers.
If we gave you a blind choice of three mutual funds - Fund X, Fund Y, and Fund Z -- and we told you that each of the three had generated an average annualized return of about 15% over the past five years, you might think that the choice was a no-brainer.....After all, with a return like that, each fund would be in the top 5% of all mutual funds, so how could you go wrong?
| Average annualized return (Calendar years 2000-2004) | |
|---|---|
| Fund X | 14.98% |
| Fund Y | 14.98% |
| Fund Z | 14.99% |
| Total return for the year (%): | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | |
| Fund A | 14.11 | 6.53 | 12.21 | 30.68 | 12.72 |
| Fund B | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 101.00 |
| Fund C | -8.00 | 23.86 | -17.35 | 108.93 | 2.93 |
| Total return for the year (%): | Average annualized return (Calendar years 2000-2004) 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004
| Fund A (also Fund X) | 14.11 | 6.53 | 12.21 | 30.68 | 12.72 | 14.98%
| Fund B (also Fund Y) | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 101.00 | 14.98%*
| Fund C (also Fund Z) | -8.00 | 23.86 | -17.35 | 108.93 | 2.93 | 14.99%
| | ||||||
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Some additional points about the item above:
When XYZ fund company wants a brokerage firm to push XYZ mutual funds, XYZ fund company typically pays the broker a bribe, which is euphemistically referred to as a "revenue-sharing payment".....Recently, federal and state regulators have been gunning for revenue-sharing payments, attacking them from the brokerage side (that was the crux of the recent Edward Jones case) as well as from the fund company side.....Fund companies that make revenue-sharing payments typically defend themselves by pointing to "disclosures" they have made in fund Statements of Additional Information, but these disclosures have mostly been a sham: A few vague, legalistic sentences buried deep in a document that the average investor never sees, and probably couldn't find even if he or she wanted to.....Recently, spurred on by their lawyers, fund companies have been beefing up their revenue-sharing disclosures.....A good case in point is the old and new revenue-sharing disclosure for Fidelity Magellan ("FDC," below, stands for "Fidelity Distributors Corporation"):
| The old revenue-sharing disclosure for Fidelity Magellan | The new revenue-sharing disclosure for Fidelity Magellan | |
|---|---|---|
| "FDC may compensate intermediaries that satisfy certain criteria established from time to time by FDC relating to the level or type of services provided by the intermediary, the sale or expected sale of significant amounts of shares, or other factors." | "FDC or an affiliate may compensate intermediaries that distribute and/or service investors in the fund, or, at the direction of a retirement plan's
named fiduciary, make payments to intermediaries for certain plan expenses or
otherwise for the benefit of plan participants and beneficiaries. A number of
factors are considered in determining whether to pay these additional amounts.
In certain situations, such factors may include, without limitation, the level
or type of services provided by the intermediary, the level or expected level
of assets or sales of shares, the placing of the funds on a preferred or
recommended fund list, access to an intermediary's personnel, and other
factors. In addition to such payments, FDC or an affiliate may offer other
incentives in the form of sponsorship of educational or client seminars
relating to current products and issues, assistance in training and educating
the intermediaries' personnel, and/or payments of costs and expenses associated
with attendance at seminars, including travel, lodging, entertainment and
meals. FDC anticipates that payments will be made to hundreds of
intermediaries, including some of the largest broker-dealers and other
financial firms, and these payments may be significant. As permitted by SEC and
the National Association of Securities Dealers rules and other applicable laws
and regulations, FDC may pay or allow other incentives or payments to
intermediaries.
These additional payments, which are sometimes referred to as "revenue sharing," may represent a premium over payments made by other fund families, and investment professionals may have an added incentive to sell or recommend a fund or a share class over others offered by competing fund families." |
Fortune magazine recently published its annual list of the "100 best companies to work for," and two mutual fund firms made the cut: American Century (#26), and Vanguard (#72).....Fortune notes that American Century
| "...[gave] every employee...a $1,000 cash bonus in '03 to celebrate success after three years of down markets. The company puts up to 13% of each employee's salary into a profit-sharing plan, regardless of employee contribution." |
| "staffers get the rooms with a view....[while] officers sit in interior spaces. The firm offers an onsite MBA at all three of its U.S. locations..." |
Of course, there are also fund companies that aren't so great to work for.....Here's FundAlarm's exclusive lowdown on the five fund companies where you'd least like to spend your time:
| "Ever since fund managers allowed market timers to steal money from kids (Columbia Young Investor), employees leaving the office have been harassed by gangs of angry children." |
| "On orders of CEO Edward Johnson, workers who don't hew to the Republican party line must watch videotapes of John Kerry campaign speeches during their lunch hour." |
| "'Are we a growth firm or a value firm? Are we geniuses or fools? Are we humble, or still arrogant?' Firm's recent, split personality causes many employees to seek mental health care." |
| "Bill Miller needs a glass of water. Bill Miller has noted a relationship between the average salary of the Baltimore Orioles and the Gross National Product. Bill Miller wants to talk about similarities between elephant behavior and the stock market. Bill Miller has a minor case of gas. It gets old fast." |
| "Employees enjoy working for a well-respected, scandal-free firm, with a long history of fiduciary responsibility and manager continuity. No, wait, that's some other place. " |
Briefly noted:
| "American Express had a pervasive sales culture that was established and managed with one thing in mind - to push American Express products [i.e., mutual funds]...that in many cases benefited American Express at the expense of its clients." |
| "You have the opportunity to drive a Mercedes-Benz for one year FREE...that's right, your own 2001 Mercedes-Benz C230 sedan...Drive your client portfolio with AXP European Equities Fund." |
